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DISORDER IN THE COURT: THE USE OF  




Preventive detention measures in Canada were implemented in order to 
protect us from the most dangerous individuals in society. The Dangerous 
2IIHQGHUSURYLVLRQVSHUPLWWKHVWDWHWRLPSULVRQDQRIIHQGHULQGHÀQLWHO\
In order to justify such drastic action, psychiatric assessments are 
conducted in an attempt to determine who, among the “worst” offenders, 
would be most likely to commit a dangerous offence in the future. This 
paper will review the dangerous offender system in Canada, and in that 
context, critically reconsider the ability of mental health professionals 
to predict the risk of future dangerousness. Despite widespread 
disagreement concerning evaluation methods and the fallibility of the 
most common assessment tools, sentencing courts rely heavily upon 
expert opinions. Given this uncertainty, however, psychiatric testimony 
should be used cautiously, and only as a supplement to the court’s own 
assessment. Recommendations are presented for making the most of 
current techniques, and to protect those who may otherwise become 
victims of “disorder in the court.”
† Matthew Lafond (B.A. (Hons.), Queen’s) received his LL.B. from Dalhousie Law School in 
2005.  He would like to thank Professor Kaiser for his help and guidance in writing this paper.
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“Dangerousness,” according to Steven Yannoulidis, “is a subjective 
concept, which is attributed to individuals taking account of calculable 
actuarial risk and the subjective fear which they invoke.”1 For decades, 
however, mental health experts have attempted to objectify dangerous-
ness, in order to make it amenable to measurement, and ideally, con-
trol.
Preventive detention provisions exist to protect society from those 
offenders who present an intolerably high risk to public safety. The leg-
islation requires that those declared dangerous offenders be given inde-
terminate sentences. In reaching a conclusion regarding the dangerous-
ness of an offender, the court will hear the testimony of a psychiatric 
expert, who conducts an assessment in an attempt to predict the indi-
vidual’s risk of committing dangerous acts in the future.
This paper will survey the dangerous offender system in Canada, 
ÀUVWE\H[DPLQLQJWKHCriminal Code provisions that create it, and then 
by presenting an overview of the jurisprudence surrounding the con-
stitutionality and interpretation of this legislation. This will emphasize 
WKHVLJQLÀFDQWZHLJKWJLYHQWRWKHIRUHQVLFDVVHVVPHQWLQMXGLFLDOGHFL-
sions.
Next, there will be a description of the most popular techniques used 
by psychiatrists to arrive at their conclusions. A critical examination of 
WKHUHVHDUFKÀQGLQJVZLOOUHYHDOWKDWHYHQWKHPRVWIUHTXHQWO\XVHGDQG
empirically robust measure, the Hare Psychopathy Checklist⎯Revised, 
FDQQRWSURYLGHFRQÀGHQWDQVZHUVWRWKH´GDQJHURXVQHVVµTXHVWLRQ
Finally, there will be a review of the research, which suggests that 
because psychiatric assessments offer only a precarious solution to a 
GLIÀFXOW SUREOHP WKH WHVWLPRQ\ RIPHQWDO KHDOWK H[SHUWV LQ VHQWHQF-
ing hearings should be limited to supplementing (and not replacing) the 
court’s judgement of an offender’s prospects. The result is several rec-
ommendations that may be implemented to reduce the prevalence of 
error and maximize the usefulness of available information.
1 Steven T. Yannoulidis, “Negotiating ‘Dangerousness’: Charting a Course Between Psychiatry 
and Law” (2002) 9 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 151 at 155.
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I. THE DANGEROUS OFFENDER AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION
$FFRUGLQJWR$QGUHZ)RUUHVWHUSUHYHQWLYHGHWHQWLRQZDVÀUVWUHFRP-
mended in 1895 by the Gladstone Committee on Prisons in England, 
in order to segregate “for long periods of detention” a group of habit-
ual offenders for whom regular punishment was inadequate.2 The term 
´SUHYHQWLYHGHWHQWLRQµQRZUHIHUVWRFRQÀQHPHQWRUFRQWUROEDVHGRQ
the perception of a high risk of future criminality. In Canada, the use of 
preventive detention has been expanding, and includes the dangerous 
offender provisions, long-term offender provisions, and the use of an-
nual recognizances.
Determining whether the appropriate sentence in a given case is life 
imprisonment or preventive detention may be problematic. Manson sug-
JHVWVWKDWDOLIHVHQWHQFHLVMXVWLÀHGZKHQWKHRIIHQFHLVSDUWLFXODUO\EUX-
tal, especially in the context of previous offences, making public safety 
the foremost consideration.3 On the other hand, when a psychological 
assessment suggests continuing dangerousness, but the current offence 
does not itself justify a life sentence, the result should be a dangerous 
offender designation. A dangerous offender application is intended for 
the particular group of very dangerous people from whom the public 
needs to be protected.4
1. The Dangerous Offender in Canada
The current dangerous offender regime was originally enacted in 1977,5 
largely in response to the recommendation of the Ouimet Committee, 
which examined the cases of eighty habitual offenders detained on the 
basis of the extant system.6 The Committee concluded that almost 40% 
2 Andrew Forrester, “Preventive Detention, Public Protection and Mental Health” (2002) 13 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 329. Forrester notes that it wasn’t until 1908 that such additional 
sentences became law. The legislation didn’t work then, and, Forrester claims “if history can be 
considered to predict the future, we can surely expect resounding failure” of future preventive 
detention regimes (at 341).
3 Allan Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 314.
4 See R. v. Neve (1999), 137 C.C.C. (3d) 97, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 649 (Alta. C.A.) [Neve cited to 
C.C.C.].
5 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1977, S.C. 1976-77, c. 53, s. 14.
6 Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Cor-
rections (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969).
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of their subjects did not represent a serious threat to public safety. It sug-
JHVWHGWKDWLQGHWHUPLQDWHGHWHQWLRQFRXOGRQO\EHMXVWLÀHGLQWKHFDVHRI
´GDQJHURXVRIIHQGHUVµDQGUHFRPPHQGHGDIRFXVRQVSHFLÀFRIIHQFHV
noting concerns with the ability to predict future dangerousness gener-
ally. 
In 1997, Bill C-55 revised the dangerous offender provisions.7 The 
government dubbed the Bill its “high-risk offender” legislation. It added 
WKHORQJWHUPRIIHQGHUSURYLVLRQVUHTXLUHGWKDWDQ\RQHEHLQJFODVVLÀHG
a dangerous offender be given an indeterminate sentence, and provided 
for judicial restraint by allowing controls to be placed on high-risk in-
dividuals.8
The relevant provisions are set out in Part XXIV of the Criminal 
Code,9LQVHFWLRQV7KHÀUVWFRQGLWLRQLVFRQYLFWLRQIRUD´VH-
rious personal injury offence,” which is either a sexual assault, or an 
indictable offence punishable by more than ten years imprisonment in-
volving violence or danger to life, safety, or psychological well-being.10 
If the prosecutor has grounds to believe that the offender might be found 
to be a dangerous (or long-term) offender, there may be an application 
WRKDYHDQDVVHVVPHQWUHSRUWÀOHGZLWKWKHFRXUWDVHYLGHQFH
752.1 (1) Application for remand for assessment—Where an 
offender is convicted of a serious personal injury offence or an 
offence referred to in paragraph 753.1(2)(a) and, before sentence is 
imposed on the offender, on application by the prosecution, the court 
7 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (high risk offenders), the Corrections and Conditional 
Release Act, the Criminal Records Act, the Prisons and Reformatories Act and the Department 
of the Solicitor General Act, S.C. 1997, c. 17, ss. 4-8.
8 See Department of Justice, News Release, “Bill C-55 Comes into Force” (21 July 1997), 
online: Department of Justice Canada <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/1997/c55com.
html>.




(i) the use or attempted use of violence against another person, or 
LLFRQGXFWHQGDQJHULQJRUOLNHO\WRHQGDQJHUWKHOLIHRUVDIHW\RIDQRWKHUSHUVRQRULQÁLFWLQJRU
OLNHO\WRLQÁLFWVHYHUHSV\FKRORJLFDOGDPDJHRQDQRWKHUSHUVRQ
and for which the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more, or 
(b) an offence or attempt to commit an offence mentioned in section 271 (sexual assault), 272 
(sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) or 273 (aggra-
vated sexual assault).
DISORDER IN THE COURT . . . 5 
is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
offender might be found to be a dangerous offender under section 
753 or a long-term offender under section 753.1, the court may, by 
order in writing remand the offender, for a period not exceeding 
sixty days, to the custody of the person that the court directs and who 
can perform an assessment, or can have an assessment performed by 
experts. The assessment is to be used as evidence in an application 
under sections 753 or 753.1.
(2) Report—The person to whom the offender is remanded shall 
ÀOHDUHSRUWRIWKHDVVHVVPHQWZLWKWKHFRXUWQRWODWHUWKDQÀIWHHQ
days after the end of the assessment period and make copies of it 
available to the prosecutor and counsel for the offender.
The application by the prosecutor for a remand for up to sixty days to 
KDYHDUHSRUWFRPSOHWHGLVWKHÀUVWVWHSRIWKHDVVHVVPHQWSURFHVV7KH
SUHUHTXLVLWHV RI WKLV GHPDQG DUH ÀUVW WKDW WKH SHUVRQ KDV EHHQ FRQ-
victed, but not yet sentenced,11 of a personal injury offence or an offence 
under s. 753.1(2)(a);12 and second, that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the offender might receive one of the designations. This 
single, court-approved assessment replaced the previous requirement 
that each party retain their own psychiatrist to tender evidence at a hear-
ing.13
,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIÀOLQJDVHFWLRQUHSRUWWKHUH
are a number of procedural requirements outlined in section 754 that 
11 There is an exception to this in s. 753(2), which allows an application to be made after a sen-
tence has been imposed, if the offender was given notice of this possibility prior to sentencing, 
the application is commenced within six months of sentencing, and it is shown that there is rel-
evant evidence that was not reasonably available to the prosecution at the time of the sentencing 
which has since become available.
12 This section lists the potential offences leading to a long-term offender designation, and con-
sists of several sexual offences.
13 See Manson, supra note 3 at 321-22. The author notes that this single assessment process 
presents several problems not considered by the Task Force on High-Risk Violent Offenders, 
who recommended the change. First, not every Canadian jurisdiction has at its disposal a multi-
GLVFLSOLQDU\ IRUHQVLF FOLQLF FDSDEOH RI SURGXFLQJ D VXIÀFLHQWO\ WKRURXJK UHSRUW 6HFRQG WKH
recommendation was based on observations of the apparently liberal methods used by Dutch 
mental health professionals. Manson suggests that their Canadian counterparts are usually more 
guarded and conservative. He also seems to imply that since provincial mental health facilities 
often have problems hiring staff, those working in them may be less capable than some of their 
colleagues, and is therefore concerned about the enormous power vested in them by s. 752.1.
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PXVWEHIXOÀOOHGEHIRUHDKHDULQJFDQSURFHHG14 Section 753(1) outlines 
the test to be used in determining if an offender is a dangerous offender, 
and consists of two branches.
7KHÀUVWEUDQFKLVXVHGZKHQWKHUHKDVEHHQDFRQYLFWLRQIRUDYLR-
lent indictable offence punishable by at least ten years imprisonment. 
7KHUHPXVWEHDÀQGLQJ WKDW WKHRIIHQGHU´FRQVWLWXWHVD WKUHDW WR WKH
life, safety, or physical or mental well-being of other persons,” through 
failing to restrain behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury; 
persistent aggressive behaviour showing indifference to the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of behaviour; or acts “of such a brutal nature 
as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is 
unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint.”15
The second branch applies where there has been a conviction for 
VH[XDODVVDXOW,WUHTXLUHVDÀQGLQJWKDWWKHRIIHQGHU·VFRQGXFWVKRZVD
“failure to control his or her sexual impulses,” and that there is a like-
lihood that he will cause “injury, pain or other evil to other persons 
through failure in the future to control…sexual impulses.”16
,IHLWKHUEUDQFKRIWKHWHVWLVVDWLVÀHGEH\RQGDUHDVRQDEOHGRXEWRI
the likelihood of threat), the judge may label the offender a “dangerous 
offender.”17 In R. v. Lyons,18 the Supreme Court noted that the judge 
does retain some discretion, and Neve19 emphasized the importance of 
accommodating particular factors in each individual’s case. Most re-
cently, in R. v. Johnson,20WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI&DQDGDDIÀUPHGWKDWD
judge retains the discretion not to make the declaration where the goal 
of protecting the public could be met by imposing a less restrictive sanc-
tion.
If a dangerous offender designation is imposed, an indeterminate 
sentence is mandatory.21 An appellate court may overturn the designa-
14 Consent of the provincial attorney general (s. 754(1)(a)), and seven days notice by the pros-
ecutor to the offender outlining the basis for the application (s. 754(1)(b)). Section 754 (2) speci-
ÀHVWKDWWKHKHDULQJLVDOZD\VFRQGXFWHGE\DMXGJHZLWKRXWDMXU\
15 Criminal Code, supra note 9 at ss. 753(1)(a)(i)-(iii).
16 Supra note 9 at s. 753(1)(b).
17 Supra note 9 at s. 753(1).
18 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, 89 N.S.R. (2d) 271[Lyons cited to S.C.R.].
19 Supra note 4.
20 [2003] 2 S.C.R. 357, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 296 [Johnson].
21 Criminal Code, supra note 9 at s. 753(4).
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WLRQ DQG LPSRVH D À[HG VHQWHQFH ,I WKH GHVLJQDWLRQ VWDQGV D SDUROH
board will review the case “as soon as possible after the expiration of 
seven years” from the date of the arrest, and then every two years there-
after, to determine whether parole is appropriate.22 The protection of-
fered by this provision is slight, however, as Professor Manson notes 
that between 1987 and 1992, 98.5% of applications for full parole by 
dangerous offenders were rejected.23
2. The Constitutionality of the Dangerous Offender Provisions
i) R. v. Lyons
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI&DQDGDÀUVWFRQVLGHUHGWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RI
the dangerous offender provisions in Lyons.24 The offender was sixteen 
years old when he was charged with break-and-enter. He waived his 
preliminary inquiry and pleaded guilty. The Crown commenced a dan-
gerous offender application, and the trial judge concluded that the re-
quirements had been met, since Lyons had a “sociopathic personality.” 
In the Supreme Court, it was argued that the indeterminate sentence 
provisions of the Criminal Code infringed Charter25 sections 7, 9, 11, 
and 12. La Forest J., writing for the majority, began by describing the 
dangerous offender process as one in which an indeterminate sentence 
LVLPSRVHGLQOLHXRIDÀ[HGVHQWHQFHIRUDVHULRXVSHUVRQDOLQMXU\RI-
fence. It was not based simply on “fears or suspicions about…criminal 
proclivities.”267KHSXQLVKPHQWLQIDFWÁRZVIURPWKHDFWXDOFRPPLV-
VLRQRIDVSHFLÀFFULPH/D)RUHVW-ZURWH
It is clear that the indeterminate detention is intended to serve both 
punitive and preventative purposes. Both are legitimate aims of the 
criminal sanction…. Part XXI [now Part XXIV] merely enables the 
court to accommodate its sentence to the common sense reality that 
the present condition of the offender is such that he or she is not 
22 Supra note 9 at s. 761(1).
23 Manson, supra note 3 at 328.
24 Supra note 18.
25 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
26 Supra note 18 at para. 24.
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inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint so that future 
YLROHQWDFWVFDQTXLWHFRQ¿GHQWO\EHH[SHFWHGRIWKDWSHUVRQ27
He concluded that the provisions did not violate a principle of funda-
mental justice, nor did they violate section 7 of the Charter. 
La Forest J. next considered whether the provisions constituted cru-
el and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter. He engaged 
in a gross-disproportionality analysis, asking whether indeterminate 
detention is unusually severe, and whether the severe sentence serves 
any additional penological purpose. He concluded that the scheme was 
appropriately tailored to its target group, and effectively accomplished 
its goals. The indeterminacy of the sentence was saved by the existence 
of the parole process, which he claimed “ensures that incarceration is 
imposed for only as long as the circumstances…require.”28 As Manson 
noted, La Forest J. was not troubled by the fact that the parole criteria 
GLGQRWUHTXLUHDÀQGLQJRIGDQJHURXVQHVVWRVXSSRUWFRQWLQXHGGHWHQ-
tion.29
La Forest J. next dismissed arguments under section 9 of the Charter 
that the scheme constituted arbitrary detention. He stated simply that “in 
no sense of the word can the imprisonment resulting from the success-
ful invocation of Part XXI be considered ‘arbitrary’.”30 He stated that 
WKH OHJLVODWLRQGHÀQHVDFODVVRISDUWLFXODURIIHQGHUVDQGVSHFLÀFDOO\
prescribes the conditions under which they may receive the designation. 
Thus, there is no element of arbitrariness.
Another challenge was mounted with respect to section 11(f), which 
JXDUDQWHHVDULJKWWRWULDOE\MXU\IRUVHQWHQFHVRIÀYHRUPRUH\HDUV31 
Dangerous offender hearings are conducted by judge alone. La Forest J. 
decided that because the dangerous offender application was not a new 
charge, but part of the sentencing process, section 11 did not apply.
27 Supra note 18 at para. 27.
28 Supra note 18 at para. 49. But see the discussion above, supra note 23 and accompanying 
text. 
29 Supra note 3 at 331. Manson argues that this is the weakest part of the Lyons decision, be-
FDXVHLWIDLOVWRDSSUHFLDWHWKDWFRQWLQXLQJGDQJHURXVQHVVLVWKHPDLQMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUFRQWLQX-
ing detention. He also argues that as dangerous offenders spend increasing amounts of time 
LQFRQÀQHPHQWWKHLUDELOLW\WRFUHDWHDYLDEOHUHOHDVHSODQDOVRGLPLQLVKHVFRPSRXQGLQJWKH
problem.
30 Supra note 18 at para. 61.
31 Charter, supra note 25.
DISORDER IN THE COURT . . . 9 
In considering whether the use of psychiatric testimony was funda-
mentally unfair because of its uncertainty,32 La Forest J. distinguished 
between infallibility and relevance. He wrote: “Indeed, inherent in the 
notion of dangerousness is the risk, not the certainty, of harm.”33 He 
acknowledged the concerns of Isabel Grant when she wrote that “surely 
if we add ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ to a ‘future likelihood’ the sum 
total can be no greater than a balance of probabilities;”34 but reminded 
us that the basis of law is not logic, but experience. “The most that can 
be established in a future context is a likelihood of certain events occur-
ring. To doubt this conclusion is…to doubt the validity of the legislative 
objectives embodied in Part XXI.”35 Furthermore, La Forest J. asserted 
WKDW LWZDV HQWLUHO\ ORJLFDO WR EH VDWLVÀHGEH\RQG D UHDVRQDEOH GRXEW
that the test of dangerousness has been met (that there exists a certain 
potential for harm), without assuming an ability to predict the future. 
“[P]sychiatric evidence,” the Court claimed, “is clearly relevant to the 
issue whether a person is likely to behave in a certain way and, indeed, 
is probably relatively superior in this regard to the evidence of other 
clinicians and lay persons.”36 In support of this statement, La Forest J. 
cited an article written by a leading forensic mental health professional 
and a criminologist.37
In considering the problem of “false positives,” that is, the errone-
ous over-prediction of future violence, La Forest J. wrote: “This prob-
lem does not appear to undermine the utility and fairness of the scheme 
so much as to fortify the conclusion that the procedural protections ac-
corded the offender, especially on review, ought to be very rigorous.” 
He indicated that the scheme balances alternative risks: the risk of harm 
to potential victims and the risk of unnecessarily detaining offenders 
judged to be dangerous. Since the offender is “in the wrong by the virtue 
32 See discussion of the use of psychiatric assessments of dangerousness, infra.
33 Supra note 18 at para. 92.
34 Isabel Grant, “Dangerous Offenders” (1985) 9 Dal. L.J. 347 at 360.
35 Supra note 18 at para. 93.
36 Supra note 18 at para. 97.
37 See Robert J. Menzies, Christopher D. Webster & Diana S. Sepejak, “The Dimensions of 
Dangerousness: Evaluating the Accuracy of Psychometric Predictions of Violence Among Fo-
rensic Patients” (1985) 9 Law and Human Behavior 49, cited by La Forest J. in Lyons, supra 
note 18 at para. 97.
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RIWKHULVNKHUHSUHVHQWVµZHDUHMXVWLÀHGLQ´LPSRVLQJRQKLPWKHULVN
of unnecessary measures.”38
ii) Supreme Court Jurisprudence Since Lyons
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI&DQDGDDIÀUPHGDQGH[SDQGHGXSRQLyons in R. 
v. Jones,39 which was a challenge based on sections 7 and 10(b) of the 
Charter to Mr. Jones’s dangerous offender designation.
In November 1986, the appellant was charged with three counts of 
VH[XDODVVDXOWZLWKDZHDSRQDQGWKUHHRIXQODZIXOFRQÀQHPHQW3ULRU
to election, the appellant’s counsel obtained a court order under what 
was then section 537(1)(b) of the Criminal Code40 for a remand to cus-
tody for observation to determine whether the accused was sane and 
ÀWWRVWDQGWULDO7ZRSV\FKLDWULVWVDQGRQHSV\FKRORJLVWDWWKHIRUHQVLF
institution examined Jones. He was not told that during the 30-day re-
mand, the focus shifted to the determination of an opinion on whether 
he was a dangerous offender. The doctors concluded he was extremely 
dangerous and likely to re-offend. The appellant pleaded guilty, and 
following his conviction, a dangerous offender hearing was held. The 
Crown attempted to make use of the reports that the clinicians prepared 
during Jones’s remand, but the defence argued that to admit the results 
of pre-trial psychiatric exams without the consent or warning of the ac-
cused would violate section 7. Additionally, it was claimed that the ac-
cused’s section 10(b) right to counsel was violated when he was not 
advised that his assessments included observations regarding his future 
dangerousness.
In his majority opinion, Gonthier J. referred to the case of R. v. 
Wilband,41 where the Court concluded that the rules of evidence regard-
ing hearsay and confessions did not apply to dangerous sex offender 
proceedings, because as a form of sentencing, guilt had already been es-
tablished. Similarly, in R. v. Langevin,42 it was held that neither section 
7 nor section 11(c) guaranteed a right to be warned against the possible 
38 Supra note 18 at para. 100.
39 [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229, (1994) 89 C.C.C. (3d) 353 [Jones cited to S.C.R.].
40 Supra note 9.
41 [1967] S.C.R. 14, [1967] 2 C.C.C. 6.
42 (1984), 39 C.R. (3d) 333, 45 O.R. (2d) 705 (C.A.).
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use of statements made during an initial psychiatric examination in sub-
sequent dangerous offender hearings. Gonthier J. wrote: 
I cannot agree with the characterization…that the results of the 
psychiatric observation are used to “incriminate” the accused at his 
dangerous offender proceedings…. By the time the accused reaches 
the dangerous offender proceeding state, he has already been found 
culpable of the offence for which he was charged.
43
*RQWKLHU-WKHQDIÀUPHGWKDWGDQJHURXVRIIHQGHUSURFHHGLQJVZHUHQRW
characterized as a new trial, and thus were not afforded the same pro-
cedural protections. In noting that section 7 was not violated, the Court 
acknowledged that while these protections extended to the pre-trial pe-
riod, “statements volunteered by an accused to an agent of the state will 
not infringe an accused’s section 7 right to silence.”44 Jones was not 
“tricked” into making statements. In fact, he was warned the statements 
might be used against him in court. Gonthier J. also noted that “in the 
case of dangerous offender proceedings, it is all the more important that 
the court be given access to the widest possible range of information in 
order to determine whether there is a serious risk to public safety.”45 To 
GHQ\WKHFRXUWDFFHVVWRWKHSV\FKLDWULVWV·ÀQGLQJVWKH&RXUWFODLPHG
might hinder the effective determination of the true risk posed by the 
offender. It was ordered that the evidence emerging from the evaluation 
be admitted.46
The section 10(b) argument was also rejected. Since the Crown was 
not under an obligation to notify the accused of its intention to make a 
dangerous offender application prior to a plea being entered, there was 
no reason that the doctors should have been required to provide such a 
warning.
Interestingly, Gonthier J. stressed that “[a]n indeterminate sentence 
is not an unlimited sentence…. The offender faces incarceration only 
for the period of time that he poses a serious risk to the safety of so-
43 Jones, supra note 39 at para. 27.
44 Supra note 39 at para. 36.
45 Supra note 39 at para. 45.
46 There was a strong dissent of four judges, who concluded that the rule against self-incrimina-
tion applied even if dangerous offender hearings are characterized as a form of sentencing. 
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ciety.”47 This notion was also conveyed in Lyons,48 where La Forest J. 
referred to the parole process as a legitimizing factor. However, these 
decisions preceded the changes in Bill C-55,49 which increased the ini-
tial period of parole ineligibility from three years to seven, and every 
two years thereafter.50 There is no guarantee that the parole board has 
the capacity (or the will) to accurately reassess the continuing risk for 
dangerousness.
iii) Developments in Lower Courts
The decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in R. v. Brown51 
upheld the Criminal Code provisions authorizing the sixty-day remand 
for psychiatric assessments for dangerous offender applications.52 Smith 
J. held that there was no violation of Charter rights, because society’s 
interest in protecting against future risk outweighed the offender’s right 
against self-incrimination. However, an offender could not be punished 
for refusing to participate in the assessment, and this refusal should not 
lead to an adverse inference.
,WLVDOVRVLJQLÀFDQWWKDW6PLWK-KHOGWKDWDQ´DVVHVVPHQWµXQGHU
WKHQHZVHFWLRQGLGQRWGLIIHUVLJQLÀFDQWO\IURPDQ´REVHUYDWLRQµ
under the previous section 756. Yet, she wrote:
Previously, assessments of this nature were often informal and 
unstructured, and frequently resulted in opinions that were more 
impressionistic than reliable. The strategic structural guidelines 
now used have been found to increase the level of accuracy in an 
assessment’s prediction of an offender’s risk of future violence.53
She later noted that “‘observation’ under the old regime is negligibly 
different from ‘assessment’ under the new regime. In effect, no practical 
difference may be ascertained.”54 It is unfortunate that Smith J. did not 
47 Jones, supra note 39 at para. 45.
48 Supra note 18.
49 Supra note 7.
50 Criminal Code, supra note 9 at s. 761(1).
51 (2000), 142 B.C.A.C. 151.
52 Supra note 9 at s. 752.1(1).
53 Brown, supra note 51 at para. 12.
54 Supra note 51 at para. 28.
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take this opportunity to forcefully foreclose the possibility of utilizing 
any obsolete techniques in the new assessments, even after recognizing 
their weaknesses.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal took a stronger stance in R. v. 
J.T.H.55 Freeman J.A., writing for the court, urged judges to give greater 
weight to empirically-based actuarial studies than to clinical observation 
in deciding whether to designate someone a dangerous offender.56 The 
accused pleaded guilty to charges of sexual and indecent assault. The 
Crown had relied on two experts with opposite opinions. Dr. Aquino, 
head of the Provincial Forensic Psychiatric Service, observed and in-
terviewed the accused during a 30-day remand and concluded that there 
was a substantial risk he would re-offend, based on his history of devi-
ant sexual impulses. On the other hand, Dr. Kelln, a clinical and forensic 
psychologist, conducted tests based on actuarial screening tools. These 
scores are based on interviews, the offender’s history, and the nature of 
his crimes. The results of these tests put the accused at a “moderate” 
risk of recidivism. Dr. Kelln claimed these tests were “state of the art,” 





Even though the data bases forming the foundations of the actuarial 
LQVWUXPHQWV DUH VWLOO ZRUNV LQ SURJUHVV«DQG SUHGLFWLRQV EDVHG
XSRQWKHPDUHOHVVWKDQSHUIHFWWKH\KDYHWKHYLUWXHRIWDNLQJLQWR
DFFRXQWDOONQRZQUHOHYDQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQVDQGQRWPHUHO\WKHPRVW
VWULNLQJRQHV7KH\DSSHDU WREH WKHEHVW WRROVDYDLODEOHDQG WKDW
may account for the special status accorded assessments performed 
by experts in s. 752.1.
57
55 (2002), 170 C.C.C. (3d) 405, 2002 NSCA 138.
56 7KLVLVVDJHDGYLFHFRQVLGHULQJÀQGLQJVVXFKDVWKRVHLQ'DQLHO$.UDXVV	'DH+R/HH
“Deliberating on Dangerousness and Death: Jurors’ Ability to Differentiate Between Expert 
Actuarial and Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness” (2003) 26 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 113. The 
UHVHDUFKHUVDIÀUPWKHVXSHULRULW\RIDFWXDULDOPHDVXUHVRYHUFOLQLFDORSLQLRQEXWQRWHWKDWMXURUV
WHQGWREHPRUHLQÁXHQFHGE\FOLQLFDOSUHGLFWLRQVRIGDQJHURXVQHVVWKDQDFWXDULDORQHVHYHQ
after cross-examination on the testimony. The same effect might hold for judges.
57 Supra note 55 at para. 30.
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+HHTXDWHG'U$TXLQR·VFOLQLFDODVVHVVPHQW WR´ÁLSSLQJDFRLQµ+H
FRQFOXGHGE\QRWLQJWKDWDVXIÀFLHQWOLNHOLKRRGRIWKUHDWLVHVWDEOLVKHG
when such test results show the risk of re-offending to be in the “high” 
range, or more than 50%. The accused’s dangerous offender status was 
overturned.
In Neve,58 the accused appealed a designation as a dangerous offend-
er. She was a prostitute from the age of 12, and had several convictions, 
both as a young offender and adult, none of which involved a serious 
LQMXU\,QWKHLQVWDQWFDVHVKHDQGDIULHQGWRRNDZRPDQWRDÀHOGFXW
away her clothing, and drove away. The trial judge concluded that Neve 
was not a psychopath, but gave her an indeterminate sentence because 
she did not intend to change her lifestyle or accept treatment.
The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, but overturned 
the dangerous offender designation. The Court held that it was unrea-
sonable to sentence Neve as a dangerous offender, as she had a short 
criminal record for violence, and she did not “fall within that very small 
group that Parliament intended be designated as dangerous offenders.”59 
To meet the test, there must be a pattern of repetitive violent or aggres-
sive behaviour from which it is possible to conclude that the offender 
is a serious risk to others. The focus is on past conduct, not character. 
The Court suggested a three-part process, which considers prospects for 
treatment, the seriousness of the criminal conduct, and the offender’s 
circumstances.60
The Court also made the noteworthy observation that “[t]he problem 
with all this [expert testimony] is that the doctors may have little idea 
what any of these [legal] terms mean. And yet, obviously, their opinions 
will be based on whatever interpretation they give to those terms.”61 
Furthermore, it was suggested that “[t]o assist the psychiatrists in giving 
opinions on what a pattern reveals, both in terms of past conduct and 
58 Supra note 4.
59 Supra note 4 at para. 3.
60 See also R. v. George (1998), 126 C.C.C. (3d) 384 (B.C.C.A.). George pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter for killing a 79-year-old man by beating him in the face with a rock. He was an 
aboriginal person who was likely born with fetal alcohol syndrome and had a low IQ. The Court 
allowed his appeal from a dangerous offender designation. The killing was markedly different 
from the other incidents in George’s history, and the trial judge erred in considering his child-
hood behaviour as evidence of an aggressive pattern. The social realities of the accused’s back-
ground necessitated the differentiation between childhood aggression and adult criminality.
61 Supra note 4 at para. 206.
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future dangerousness, it would be advantageous if the key elements of 
the pattern were put to them.”62
3. The Impact of Dangerousness in Sentencing the Mentally 
Disordered Offender
The following cases did not involve a dangerous offender application, 
but instead discussed mental disorder and the Not Criminally Responsi-
ble (NCR) defence. However, they are relevant for consideration here be-
cause of their discussion of the impact of dangerousness on sentencing. 
Many of the factors relevant to the court in the NCR context may have 
LQFUHDVLQJ LQÁXHQFH RQ WKH UHVXOWV RI GDQJHURXV RIIHQGHU KHDULQJV LQ
light of the focus on personal circumstances mandated by Neve. There 
LVOLWWOHUHDVRQWREHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHDUHVLJQLÀFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHFLU-
cumstances or prospects of those who are “dangerous” because they are 
considered mentally ill, and those who are “dangerous” as a result of 
being labelled such by the court.
In Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute),63 the 
accused had a long history of mental illness, and had been diagnosed 
with chronic residual schizophrenia. He was arrested in 1983 for at-
tacking two individuals on the street. At trial, he was found NCR, and a 
conditional discharge was ordered under section 672.54 of the Criminal 
Code.64 The accused challenged the constitutionality of the provisions 
of the Code dealing with the review of NCR accused.
The majority held that Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code created a 
new alternative for NCR defendants, allowing an individualized assess-
ment to determine whether the person poses a continuing threat to soci-
ety, with an emphasis on providing treatment. Section 672.54 does not 
create a presumption of dangerousness, and should not impose a burden 
of proving lack of dangerousness on the accused. A Review Board must 
62 Supra note 4 at para. 207. See also Fenna H. Poletiek, “How Psychiatrists and Judges As-




63 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, [1999] S.C.J. No. 31 [Winko]. See also R. v. LePage, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 
744 (Winko’s companion case). 
64 Supra note 9.
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direct an absolute discharge if it believes that the accused is not a sig-
QLÀFDQWWKUHDW,WZDVQRWHGWKDWWKHRQO\FRQVWLWXWLRQDOEDVLVRQZKLFK
the criminal law may restrict the liberty of an NCR accused is the protec-
WLRQRIWKHSXEOLFIURPVLJQLÀFDQWWKUHDWVWRVDIHW\
This procedure differs markedly from that used in dangerous of-
fender proceedings, in that if the NCR accused isIRXQGWREHDVLJQLÀFDQW
threat to safety, the Board may order that the accused be discharged 
VXEMHFWWRFRQGLWLRQVRUGHWDLQHG2IFRXUVHDÀQGLQJRIGDQJHURXVQHVV
GXULQJDGDQJHURXVRIIHQGHUKHDULQJOHDGVWRPDQGDWRU\FRQÀQHPHQW
Besides the difference in moral culpability for committing the offence,65 
it is not clear why this difference should exist. In both cases, the primary 
concern is said to be protecting the public from potential harm. Given 
that the NCR accused presents the same potential risk, they should pre-
sumably be subject to the same restrictions. Winko also directs Review 
Boards to make the least onerous orders possible considering both the 
need to protect society from danger, and the personal needs of the ac-
cused.66 The fact is that those receiving the much more restrictive dan-
gerous offender designation also have unique psychological and social 
needs that are deserving of special attention, perhaps more so, because 
WKHLUFRQGLWLRQLVVRGLIÀFXOWWRDPHOLRUDWH
In R. v. Knoblauch,67 the Supreme Court of Canada restored the con-
ditional sentence of a trial judge, which included an order that required 
Knoblauch to reside in a secure mental health institution. Knoblauch 
had a long history of mental illness, and had threatened to use hazardous 
explosives. The Court held that even very dangerous offenders could re-
ceive conditional sentences,68 if the judge concludes that the communi-
ty’s safety would not be endangered because of the conditions imposed. 
Arbour J. concluded that since Knoblauch’s dangerousness was a com-
65 It is assumed that those who are not responsible for their actions shouldn’t be “punished” for 
them, whereas dangerous offenders are held responsible for their crimes.
66 This principle from Winko is applied in Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario 
(A.G.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 498, and its companion case Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 528. 
67 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 780, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 201.
68 The Court stresses that the conditional sentencing provisions (s. 742.1) do not exclude “dan-
gerous offenders” from access to conditional sentences. Presumably, this does not include in-
GLYLGXDOVRIÀFLDOO\GHVLJQDWHGDVGDQJHURXVRIIHQGHUVXQGHUEHFDXVHRIWKHPDQGDWRU\
effect of s. 753(4), but refers instead to offenders who have engaged in dangerous activities 
more generally. Knoblauch was not a designated dangerous offender.
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bination of his mental illness and his access to explosives, if the latter 
is precluded, the risk disappears. Incarceration similarly eliminates the 
danger, but does little to address the mental illness. The Court asserted 
that this methodology might allow mentally disordered offenders to take 
advantage of resources available in the community.
4. Summary




ly dangerous, the court will order an assessment by a forensic mental 
health expert. The individual circumstances of the accused should be 
considered in context as a factor in determining the risk that they pose.
II. THE PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS
$VQRWHGDERYHLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDSDUWLFXODULQGLYLGXDOTXDOLÀHV
as a dangerous offender, the court will order an assessment performed 
by a forensic expert,69DQGWKLVDVVHVVPHQWRIWHQKDVDVLJQLÀFDQWLPSDFW
on the sentencing disposition. There can be a great deal of variation in 
how an individual assessor chooses to perform this task, in part because 
there are numerous psychological measures that have been designed for 
WKLV VSHFLÀFSXUSRVH+HUHZHZLOOEULHÁ\FRQVLGHU WKHGHYHORSPHQW
of various forensic assessment techniques. Then, we will examine two 
competing systems used in evaluating whether an individual is prone 
to dangerous behaviour, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual (currently the DSM-IV)70 diagnosis of 
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APDDQG5REHUW+DUH·VFODVVLÀFDWLRQ
of psychopathy using his Psychopathy Checklist⎯Revised (PCL-R).71 In 
the vast majority of dangerous offender applications, one or both of 
69 Criminal Code, supra note 9 at s. 752.1(2).
70 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
4th ed. (Washington, DC: APA, 1994).
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these methods will be utilized. They will be described and critiqued 
KHUH LQ DQ HIIRUW WR GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHU WKH\ DUH VXIÀFLHQWO\ DFFXUDWH
WRMXVWLI\WKHLUFRQVLGHUDEOHLQÁXHQFHRQWKHOLYHVRIWKRVHZKRIDFHD
lifetime of institutionalization. 
1. Predicting Violence: A Brief History
Prior to the 1970s, “dangerousness” was not of much interest to forensic 
scientists. It was assumed that those involved in the administration of 
justice knew which individuals deserved particular attention because 
of their violent propensity. In 1974, however, Steadman and Cocozza72 
published the results of their study that followed 98 patients who were 
abruptly released from detention, or into less secure conditions, despite 
KDYLQJEHHQFODVVLÀHGDVD´GDQJHUWRWKHSXEOLFµ73 After two to three 
years, only about 20% were arrested, and about 2% had become involved 
in violent acts. This drew attention to the “false positive problem,” the 
notion that the prevalence of dangerousness was drastically over-per-
ceived.74 Steadman and Cocozza concluded that predicting violence was 
71 See Robert D. Hare, Manual for the Hare Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (Toronto: Multi-
Health Systems, 1991).
72 Henry J. Steadman & Joseph J. Cocozza, Careers of the Criminally Insane: Excessive Social 
Control of Deviance (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974).
73 See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). Baxstrom was civilly committed at the conclu-
sion of his criminal sentence because the authorities considered him too dangerous to be re-
leased. Baxstrom petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which the U.S. Supreme Court granted, 
and held that he had been denied the equal protection of jury review that was available to others 
who were civilly committed in the State of New York. Warren C.J. wrote: “The capriciousness 
RIWKHFODVVLÀFDWLRQHPSOR\HGE\WKH6WDWHLVWKURZQVKDUSO\LQWRIRFXVE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKHIXOO
EHQHÀWRIDMXGLFLDOKHDULQJ«LVZLWKKHOGRQO\LQWKHFDVHRIFLYLOFRPPLWPHQWRIRQHDZDLWLQJ
expiration of a penal sentence. A person with a past criminal record is presently entitled to a 
hearing on the question whether he is dangerously mentally ill so long as he is not in prison at 
the time civil commitment proceedings are instituted. Given this distinction, all semblance of 
UDWLRQDOLW\RIWKHFODVVLÀFDWLRQ«GLVDSSHDUVµDW$VDUHVXOWRIWKLVGHFLVLRQQHDUO\
inmates in hospitals for the criminally insane were transferred to civil hospitals. Eventually 
about half of these were released into the community. See further discussion in Christopher D. 
Webster et al., The Violence Prediction Scheme: Assessing Dangerousness in High Risk Men 
(Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1994) at 2.
74 See Christopher D. Webster & Gerard Bailes, “Assessing Violence Risk in Mentally and Per-
sonality Disordered Individuals” in Clive R. Hollin, ed., Handbook of Offender Assessment and 
Treatment (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 2001) 71 at 72.
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YLUWXDOO\LPSRVVLEOHODUJHO\GXHWRWKHIDFWWKDWLWLVGLIÀFXOWLQJHQHUDO
to predict events that occur with only a low frequency.75
,Q WKHV0RQDKDQSXEOLVKHGKLV LQÁXHQWLDOZRUNZKLFKGLV-
tinguished between clinical and actuarial prediction.76 He argued that 
certain demographic variables, such as past crimes and socio-econom-
ic status, are correlated to future dangerousness. However, he viewed 
mental illness as uncorrelated to the risk of future violence. Monahan 
HQFRXUDJHGWKHXVHRIVKRUWWHUPVWXGLHVXVLQJFOHDUO\GHÀQHGSUHGLF-
tors and outcomes.
In response to the demand from mental health and correctional pro-
IHVVLRQDOVIRUDSUDFWLFDOLQVWUXPHQWWRXVHLQWKHÀHOGDJURXSRIDX-
thors based at the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre in Ontario 
developed The Violence Prediction Scheme.77 Using sophisticated statis-
tical techniques, the authors evaluated data on approximately 600 men 
who had committed at least one violence offence. They were followed 
up over a seven-year period. In creating the Violence Risk Appraisal 
Guide (VRAG), they determined which factors were most correlated 
with engaging in violence after release. These factors, including such 
characteristics as elementary school maladjustment, could be compared 
to determine an offender’s relative risk.
There was some dissatisfaction with these early efforts, because 
studies showed that they generally had a low reliability. Clinicians de-
sired a universal and systematic tool to utilize in completing their as-
sessments. The DSM-IV and the PCL-R both promised to offer advances 
in this regard.
75 But see Saleem Shah, “Dangerousness: Conceptual, Prediction, and Public Policy Issues” 
in J. Ray Hays, Thomm Kevin Roberts & Kenneth S. Solway, eds., Violence and the Violent 
Individual (New York: Spectrum Publications, 1981) 151. Shah claims that saying something 
is GLIÀFXOW is not the same as saying it is impossible, and that it is unlikely that all clinicians are 
generally poor at assessing risk for violence. See also Webster & Bailes, supra note 74 at 73.
76 John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behaviour: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (Beverly 
Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1981). 
77 See Webster et al., supra note 73.
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2. The DSM-IV: Antisocial Personality Disorder
The authors of the DSM emphasize that the assessment of any disorder 
should focus on publicly observable behaviours, because these are the 
only features that are amenable to reliable assessment.78 Based on this 
DVVXPSWLRQ WKH'60GHVFULEHVDSHUVRQDOLW\GLVRUGHU WKDW LV W\SLÀHG
by a “pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of 
others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into 
adulthood.”79 It labels this condition Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(APD). 
Because of the poly-thetic approach to categorization in the DSM, 
the diagnosis can be made in a vast number of ways. Research has re-
ported that there are a total of 32,647 variations in the DSM-IV.80 De-
spite this, some supporters of the DSM diagnosis have argued that APD 
is the only personality disorder to consistently achieve high levels of 
reliability in practice.81
A task force committee of the American Psychiatric Association de-
cided the content of DSM criteria for APD.82 As Hart and Hare point out, 
however, the criteria do not constitute a scale or a test.83 Instead, the 
clinician determines if a given criterion is present or absent⎯WKHÀQDO




78 See e.g. Stephen D. Hart & Robert D. Hare, “Psychopathy: Assessment and Association with 
Criminal Conduct” in David M. Stoff, James Breiling & Jack D. Maser, eds., Handbook of An-
tisocial Behavior (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1997) 22. 
79 Supra note 70 at 645.
80 Richard Rogers et al., “Prototypical Analysis of Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Study of 
Inmate Samples” (2000) 27 Criminal Justice and Behavior 256.
81 For a review, see e.g. Scott O. Lilienfeld, Cynthia Purcell & Jacqueline Jones-Alexander, 
“Assessment of Antisocial Behaviour in Adults” in David M. Stoff, James Breiling & Jack D. 
Maser, eds., Handbook of Antisocial Behavior (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1997) 60.
82 In fact, all criteria in the DSM is based on consensus. See E. H. Marcus, “Unbiased Medical 
Testimony: Reality or Myth?” (1985) 6 Am. J. For. Psych. 3. An example of this process in ac-
tion occurred in 1973, when it was decided to remove homosexuality from the list of disorders 
based on a vote of the trustees and a 60% vote of the membership.
83 Supra note 78.
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The DSM-IV lists three major criteria and several subcriteria for an 
RIÀFLDOGLDJQRVLV*HQHUDOO\ WKHVH LQFOXGH DDSHUYDVLYHSDWWHUQRI
disregard for the rights of others since the age of 15, indicated by factors 
such as impulsivity, reckless disregard for the safety of self or others, 
lack of remorse, and failure to conform to social norms with respect 
to lawful behaviour; (b) a current age of at least 18; and (c) evidence 
of Conduct Disorder (another DSM diagnosis involving traits such as 
aggressiveness, destructiveness, and deceitfulness) before the age of 
15.84 This misconduct must not have occurred during a schizophrenic 
or manic episode. The DSM also notes that these individuals often lack 
HPSDWK\ WHQG WR EH FDOORXV DQG F\QLFDO DQG KDYH LQÁDWHG DQG DUUR-
gant self-appraisals. The diagnosis is much more common in males, and 
tends to be related to low socio-economic status. Overall prevalence in 
community samples is about 3% in males, and 1% in females, however, 
the rates are higher in forensic settings. The disorder also tends to remit 
with age, particularly by the forties.
Despite, or perhaps because of, this seemingly black-and-white ap-
SURDFK WKHGHÀQLWLRQRIAPD has received a great deal of criticism. It 
is not clear that a diagnosis as complex as “antisocial personality” can 
be made using a categorical method. The DSM permits no degrees of 
disorder⎯the criteria for diagnosis are met, or they are not. Some re-
searchers have suggested that psychopathy or antisocial personality is 
better conceived of as a dimensional construct, with traits existing in all 
individuals to a greater or lesser degree.85 A dimensional model may al-
low for greater precision in classifying offenders who exhibit a myriad 
of personality traits and behaviours.
Another serious concern is the reality that the DSM diagnosis of 
APD suffers from both over- and under-inclusiveness. Chronic antisocial 
behaviour in adults may be due to a wide variety of factors, but the DSM 
has virtually equated APD with chronic criminality. As one researcher 
has pointed out, “almost any offender in a correctional setting is hypo-
thetically entitled to a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.”86 
84 APA, supra note 70.
85 See e.g. Hart & Hare, supra note 78.
86 Hans Toch, “Psychopathy or Antisocial Personality in Forensic Settings” in Theodore Mil-
lon et al., eds., Psychopathy: Antisocial, Criminal, and Violent Behavior (New York: Guilford 
Press, 1998) 144 at 149 [emphasis in original].
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APD also encompasses a variety of conditions in addition to those tradi-
tionally associated with psychopathy, including such guiltless traits as 
cultural deviance. White noted that APD is also complicated by substance 
abuse.87 The diagnosis co-occurred with alcohol abuse 15.5 times more 
often than expected by chance. Some symptoms of APD, such as arrests, 
may be the direct result of the substance abuse, rather than the personal-
ity disorder. In fact, one study estimated the prevalence of APD in males 
generally by age 30 at 47%.88
On the other hand, some researchers have argued that the DSM is 
under-inclusive, providing a narrow conceptualization of APD.89 The di-
agnosis may fail to detect true psychopaths who have managed to avoid 
a great deal of contact with the legal system⎯in other words, the truly 
“successful” psychopaths.90 Furthermore, the aggressive conduct that 
GHÀQHVAPD tends to be rare in women, which may result in them receiv-
ing an alternative diagnosis such as Borderline Personality Disorder, 
when in fact APD may be more appropriate.
,W VKRXOGEHQRWHG DV5RJHUVSRLQWHGRXW WKDW WKHÀQDO'60,9
FULWHULDZHUHQHYHUWHVWHGGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWVXEVWDQWLDOPRGLÀFDWLRQV
were made.91 Although certain personality traits used by Hare and oth-
ers promoting the alternative Psychopathy model were recognized, they 
were relegated to “associated features.” Rogers emphasized the fact that 
the conception of APD as outlined in the DSM needs to be re-examined. 
It is interesting to note the following warning given by the American 
Psychiatric Association in the DSM itself: 
87 Helene Raskin White, “Alcohol, Illicit Drugs, and Violence” in David M. Stoff, James Breil-
ing & Jack D. Maser, eds., Handbook of Antisocial Behavior (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 
1997) 511.
88 See Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, “Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psy-
chopathy: Diagnostic Dilemmas in Classifying Patterns of Antisocial Behavior in Sentencing 
Evaluations” (1998) 16 Behav. Sci. & L. 333.
89 See e.g. Lilienfeld, Purcell & Jones-Alexander, supra note 81.
90 See also Thomas F. Oltmanns & Robert E. Emery, Abnormal Psychology, 2d ed. (Upper 
Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998) at 343. The authors note that the DSM-III was highly 
criticized for blurring the distinction between antisocial personality and criminality; it was dif-
ÀFXOWWRGLDJQRVH$3'LQVRPHRQHZKRGLGQ·WDOUHDG\KDYHDFULPLQDOUHFRUGDQGPRYHGLQWKH
direction of including many more criminals within the boundaries of the disorder. The DSM-IV 
partially responded to this by moving back to some of the original traits suggested by Cleckley 
(infra note 93), but at the expense of greater reliability.
91 Supra note 80.
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[W]hen the DSM-IV categories, criteria, and textual descriptions 
DUHHPSOR\HGIRUIRUHQVLFSXUSRVHVWKHUHDUHVLJQL¿FDQWULVNVWKDW
GLDJQRVWLFLQIRUPDWLRQZLOOEHPLVXVHGRUPLVXQGHUVWRRG«7KHXVH
of DSM-IV in forensic settings should be informed by an awareness 
RIWKHULVNVDQGOLPLWDWLRQV>RIPLVXVH@GLVFXVVHGDERYH92
3. The PCL-R: Psychopathy
,WZDV&OHFNOH\ZKRLQÀUVWV\VWHPDWLFDOO\GHVFULEHGWKHFRQGLWLRQ
we now know as psychopathy.93 For decades, Hare and his colleagues 
developed and attempted to validate a reliable rating scale that could 
tap the key features of this condition.94 The PCL-R uses expert observer 
ratings, based on a review of case histories and records, supplemented 
by interviews and behavioural observations, to make a diagnosis. The 
Revised version includes 20 items, designed for use with an adult male 
forensic population. Items are scored on a 3-point scale (from 0 = item 
does not apply to 2 = LWHPGHÀQLWHO\DSSOLHV). Total scores range from 
0 to 40, and a score of 30 is conventionally accepted as indicating the 
presence of psychopathy. The scale has an internal structure, divided 
into two factors. Factor 1 corresponds to interpersonal and affective fea-
tures (e.g., FDOORXVQHVVDQG)DFWRUUHÁHFWVDQWLVRFLDOEHKDYLRXUe.g., 
chronically unstable lifestyle).95 
In the Canadian correction system, risk assessment for the purpos-
es of conditional release, treatment, and dangerous offender hearings 
typically include an evaluation of psychopathy using the PCL-R. These 
assessments are based on a structured interview as well as historical in-
IRUPDWLRQFDVHÀOHV96 Some authors have even suggested that a failure 
to consider psychopathy when conducting a risk assessment may be un-
92 Supra note 70 at xxiii.
93 Hervey M. Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity (St. Louis, Mo.: Mosby, 1941).
94 For details of the psychometric properties of the PCL-R, see Hare, supra note 71. For an 
overview of psychometric assessment in forensic settings generally, including the PCL-R, see 
Gisli H. Gudjonsson, “Psychometric Assessment” in Clive R. Hollin, ed., Handbook of Offender 
Assessment and Treatment (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 2001) 111.
95 Michael Woodworth & Stephen Porter, “In Cold Blood: Characteristics of Criminal Homi-
cides as a Function of Psychopathy” (2002) 111 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 436.
96 Stephen D. Hart, “The Role of Psychopathy in Assessing Risk for Violence: Conceptual and 
Methodological Issues” (1998) 3 Legal and Criminological Psychology 121.
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reasonable (from a legal perspective) and unethical (from a professional 
perspective).97 The use of the PCL-R in dangerous offender hearings was 
discussed in William Head Institution v. Canada (A.G.),98 where the 
judge noted that the scale can be used to predict recidivism, and even 
suggested that, despite Dr. Hare’s recommendation, assessors possess-
ing only a Master’s degree should be permitted to perform PCL-R assess-
ments for the purposes of the criminal justice system.99
Hare describes psychopathy as a chronic mental condition associ-
DWHGZLWK D VSHFLÀF VHW RI V\PSWRPV WKDW LPSDLUV SV\FKRVRFLDO IXQF-
tioning.100 Psychopathy is understood as a cluster of personality traits, 
including remorselessness, callousness, deceitfulness, egocentricity, 
IDLOXUHWRIRUPFORVHHPRWLRQDOERQGVORZDQ[LHW\SURQHQHVVVXSHUÀ-
cial charm, and externalization of blame.101 This is exhibited as a per-
VRQDOLW\GLVRUGHUFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DQHPRWLRQDOGHÀFLWDFFRPSDQLHGE\
a lack of respect for the rights of others, and of social norms and rules. 
Clinically, a psychopath is “a dangerous person who preys on others 
across the life span.”102
A diagnosis of psychopathy has been associated with aggressive 
tendencies. A number of studies have linked higher PCL-R scores with 
violent behaviour. For example, one study showed a violent re-offence 
rate of 0% for nonpsychopaths, 7.3% for a mid-level group, and 25% for 
psychopaths. Failure rates (recidivism) were 40% for nonpsychopaths, 
and 85% for psychopaths.103 Similarly, in one study, the violent recidi-
vism rates of mentally disordered offenders from a maximum-security 
psychiatric hospital were compared over a 10-year follow-up period. A 
total of 40% of the inmates committed a violent offence. However, the 
total for those considered psychopathic was 77%.104
97 (2003), 237 F.T.R. 127, 2003 FC 780.
98 Ibid. at para. 23.
99 See e.g. Hart & Hare, supra note 78.
100 Jennifer L. Skeem, John Monahan & Edward P. Mulvey, “Psychopathy, Treatment Involve-
ment, and Subsequent Violence Among Civil Psychiatric Patients” (2002) 26 Law and Human 
Behavior 577.
101 Woodworth & Porter, supra note 96 at 436.
102 See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 88.
103 Grant T. Harris, Marnie E. Rice & Catherine A. Cormier, “Psychopathy and Violent Recidi-
vism” (1991) 15 Law and Human Behavior 625.
104 Hart & Hare, supra note 78.
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'HVSLWHWKHVHÀQGLQJVLWLVLPSRUWDQWQRWWRFRQIXVHWKHFRQFHSWRI
psychopathy with that of criminality. Criminal conduct refers to behav-
LRXUWKDWFDXVHVVLJQLÀFDQWKDUPWRRWKHUVDQGYLRODWHVVRFLDOQRUPV105 
Criminal conduct is much more pervasive in society than psychopa-
thy, and some even consider it normal behaviour for those at certain 
points in development and in given social circumstances.106 However, 
Hart and Hare claim that there is a clear link between psychopathy and 
crime, in that many psychopaths do engage in chronic criminal conduct, 
and tend to do so at a high rate and early in their life. Because of this, 
psychopaths are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime in 
society. Crimes committed by these individuals tend to be serious and 
the behaviour is persistent; many psychopaths are considered “career 
criminals.”107
Psychopaths are also considered “high-density” offenders.108 They 
tend to commit offences at a relatively high rate (when they are not 
incarcerated), and they commit a wide variety of offences. Studies have 
shown that highly psychopathic offenders had an average offence rate 
that was more than double that of those who rated low on the PCL-R. 
Hare suggested that in general, psychopaths tend to be more criminally 
active than nonpsychopaths across all variables studied.
The literature provides little evidence that psychopaths respond fa-
vourably to treatment, or at least, that an effective treatment program 
has ever been developed. In fact, some evidence has suggested that 
treatment may actually make psychopathic offenders worse. It is possi-
ble that psychotherapy helps these individuals to improve their manipu-
lation and deception skills by giving them insight into human behaviour 
in general without really learning anything about themselves. Psycho-
paths also seem adept at appearing to improve over the course of treat-
ment, in order to become candidates for early release, only to re-offend 
105 See e.g. 7HUULH0RIÀWW´$GROHVFHQFH/LPLWHGDQG/LIH&RXUVH3HUVLVWHQW$QWLVRFLDO%HKDY-
LRU$'HYHORSPHQWDO7D[RQRP\µ3V\FKRORJLFDO5HYLHZ0RIÀWWVXJJHVWVWKDW
there are two types of antisocial behaviour. One type, adolescence-limited antisocial behaviour, 
is a common, adaptive form that disappears by the time the person reaches adulthood. This type 
is unrelated to APD or psychopathy, but presumably accounts for most antisocial behaviour. 
Life-course-persistent antisocial behaviour is exhibited by relatively few individuals.
106 Hart & Hare, supra note 78.
107 Hart & Hare, supra note 78.
108 Robert D. Hare et al., “Psychopathy and the Predictive Validity of the PCL-R: An Interna-
tional Perspective” (2001) 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 623.
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shortly after re-entering the community.109 However, the main basis of 
these beliefs, a study conducted at the Penetanguishene forensic hospi-
WDOPD\KDYHEHHQVHULRXVO\ÁDZHG7KH7UHDWPHQW&RPPXQLW\XVHGE\
the researchers included radical, unconventional components. Patients 
were required to spend up to two weeks in “nude encounter groups” 
where they were fed through tubes in the walls, and were administered 
LSD, alcohol, and other substances in order to disrupt their aloofness 
and hostility, increase their anxiety, and make them chemically depend-
ent so they would be more “accessible” for treatment.110 Clearly, such 
treatment is completely inappropriate. Recent research has suggested 
that psychopaths do experience some improvement with treatment, al-
WKRXJKWKHUHVXOWVUHÁHFWRQO\PRGHVWJDLQV111
The PCL-R was developed as an alternative to the diagnostic method 
employed in the DSM. However, there is a strong association between 
a PCL-RÀQGLQJRISV\FKRSDWK\DQGD'60GLDJQRVLVRIAPD,112 with the 
major difference being in prevalence rates. DSM criteria estimate the 
presence of APD in up to 80% of offenders. The PCL-R, however, suggests 
that only 15-30% of this same population are psychopathic.113 These 
ÀQGLQJVVXJJHVWWKDWSV\FKRSDWK\LVDPRUHSUHFLVHFRQVWUXFW$VRQH
study noted:
Mental health experts performing forensic assessments for 
sentencing purposes often describe defendants as displaying 
Antisocial Personality Disorder…or some variation of the term. 
This diagnosis may have a profoundly aggravating effect on 
sentencing considerations, particularly in creating expectations that 
no rehabilitation is possible and that future criminal violence is 
inevitable…. In this regard, APD as a diagnostic construct becomes 
UHLÀHG«DQGWDNHVRQDOLIHRILWVRZQZHOOEH\RQGWKHXQGHUO\LQJ
VFLHQWLÀFVXSSRUW114
109 For a discussion of this, see Skeem, Monahan & Mulvey, supra note 101 at 579.
110 Skeem, Monahan & Mulvey, supra note 101 at 582.
111 Hart & Hare, supra note 78. As the authors point out, about 90% of those diagnosed with the 
PCL-R criteria meet DSM criteria for APD as well, but only about 30% of APD offenders meet 
PCL-R criteria for psychopathy.
112 See also Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 88.
113 Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 88 at 333-34.
114 Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 88 at 334.
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The authors further advised that:
Psychopathy [measured by the PCL-R] is emerging as a discrete 
clinical entity which may be more precise and reliable than APD in 
LGHQWLI\LQJDVXEVHWRIFULPLQDOVZKRDUHDWJUHDWHUULVNRIJHQHUDO
DVZHOODVYLROHQWFULPLQDOUHFLGLYLVP+RZHYHUUHL¿FDWLRQLVVXHV
also apply to psychopathy. Research supports a probabilistic rather 
than an absolutist application of the concept.
115
4. Summary
In completing a dangerousness assessment, mental health professionals 
use a variety of techniques. The most popular are the DSM diagnosis 
of APD, and the PCL-R analysis of psychopathy. The PCL-R is currently 
the most reliable risk assessment tool available; however, no forensic 
assessment technique can predict dangerousness with a very high level 
of accuracy.
IV. MAKING THE CASE AGAINST THE USE OF PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSESSMENTS IN COURT
1. Unreliability of Assesments
Christopher Slobogin noted the irony inherent in the law of dangerous-
ness.116 In April 1983, the District of Columbia’s Superior Court ruled 
in In re Wilson,117 that psychiatric testimony on risk of future dangerous-
ness was too unreliable to be used in civil hospital commitments. At the 
same time, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Barefoot v. Es-
telle,118 held the same type of testimony trustworthy enough to support 
a death sentence. In Barefoot, the petitioner was convicted in a Texas 
VWDWHFRXUWIRUPXUGHULQJDSROLFHRIÀFHUDQGKHZDVVHQWHQFHGWRGHDWK
The Supreme Court denied his habeas corpus petition, on the basis that 
115 Christopher Slobogin, “Dangerousness and Expertise” (1984) 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97.
116 33 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2115 (1983).
117 463 U.S. 880 (1983) [Barefoot].
118 Ibid. at 897.
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there was no merit to his argument that psychiatrists are incompetent to 
predict with acceptable reliability that a particular criminal will commit 
future crimes. White J. held that there was no violation of the Constitu-
tion, and, indeed, “prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential 
element…[of] our criminal justice system.”119 Amazingly, this was de-
spite the position of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), who, 
LQVXSSRUWRIWKHSHWLWLRQHUÀOHGDQDPLFXVEULHIVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWZRRXW
of three predictions of long-term future violence made by psychiatrists 
are wrong. The APA further argued that “a layman with access to rel-
evant statistics can do at least as well and possibly better” in predicting 
dangerousness.120 One of the State’s psychiatrists asserted that he was 
“100% sure” that an individual with the characteristics described to him 
in a hypothetical would commit acts of violence in the future.121
Ultimately, and especially with regard to the criminal law process, 
it is not helpful to decide if an individual is “dangerous” in the abstract. 
What we really want to determine is whether a person will engage in 
socially unacceptable behaviour, so detrimental to the community, that 
LWMXVWLÀHVHQJDJLQJLQSUHHPSWLYHDFWLRQ7KHOLQHEHWZHHQD´QRUPDOµ
criminal and a “dangerous” one is, at best, vague, and yet the power 
YHVWHGLQWKHLQGLYLGXDOZKRGUDZVWKDWOLQHLVVLJQLÀFDQW$V-RKQ+LQ-
ton noted, “[i]n reality, psychiatrists may be given the ultimate power of 
judge and jury in deciding both admission and discharge from places of 
indeterminate detention.”122
Ronald Blackburn commented that “it has become apparent that nei-
ther clinicians nor behavioural scientists have demonstrated the ability 
to distinguish clearly between those who are likely to exhibit dangerous 
behaviour and those who are not.”123 In his survey of the data, Monahan 
summarised the results of several attempts to identify which offenders 
119 Ibid. at 922.
120 Ibid. at 905.
121 John W. Hinton, “Ethics, Theory, Research and Practice: An Overview” in John W. Hinton, 
ed., Dangerousness: Problems of Assessment and Prediction (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1983) 1 at 1.
122 Ronald Blackburn, “Psychometrics and Personality Theory in Relation to Dangerousness” in 
John W. Hinton, ed., Dangerousness: Problems of Assessment and Prediction (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1983) 57.
123 John Monahan, “The Prevention of Violence” in John Monahan, ed., Community Mental 
Health and the Criminal Justice System (New York: Pergamon, 1976). 
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released from institutions would commit violent crimes. He found that 
between 54% and 99% of those predicted to be dangerous did not sub-
sequently commit such crimes.124 Blackburn noted that in light of such 
ÀQGLQJVGDQJHURXVQHVVZDVVLJQLÀFDQWO\RYHUHVWLPDWHGLQWKH$PHUL-
can criminal justice system.1255HVHDUFKLQ(QJODQGFRQÀUPHGWKDWERWK
psychiatrists and the courts overestimated the risks of dangerousness, 
and one author noted that psychiatrists might be responsible for “re-
straining three or four patients in order to prevent one from committing 
another violent [offence].”126 Similar concerns have also been expressed 
in the Canadian criminal law context.127
In their renowned criticism of psychiatric expertise, Ennis and Lit-
wack concluded:
[T]here is literally no evidence that psychiatrists reliably and 
accurately can predict dangerous behaviour. To the contrary, 
such predictions are wrong more often than they are right. It is 
inconceivable that a judgment could be considered an “expert” 
MXGJPHQWZKHQLWLVOHVVDFFXUDWHWKDQWKHÁLSRIDFRLQ128
Concerned with the use of these predictions in American death penalty 
cases, Ewing argued that the rendering of these predictions by mental 
KHDOWKH[SHUWVLVFRQWUDU\WRWKHVFLHQWLÀFDQGKHDOLQJWUDGLWLRQVDVVRFL-
124 Supra note 123 at 58.
125 Cyril Greenland, “Dangerousness, Mental Disorder, and Politics” in Christopher D. Webster, 
Mark H. Ben-Aron & Stephen J. Hucker, eds., Dangerousness: Probability and Prediction, Psy-
chiatry and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 25 at 30.
126 See e.g. Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2001) 
at 60-61. Professor Stuart notes that both clinical analysis and an examination of past behaviour 
have failed to accurately predict dangerousness, but cites recent research which incorporates 
actuarial predictions and clinical appraisals which is more promising, at least for the purposes 
of creating “risk categories”. He further observes that “the mountain of available research data 
OHDGVWKLQNLQJODZ\HUVWREHVXVSLFLRXVRIÀUPSV\FKLDWULFGLDJQRVLVWUHDWPHQWFODLPVRUSUHGLF-
tions about dangerousness” (at 371).
127 Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, “Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flip-
ping Coins in the Courtroom” (1974) 62 Cal. L. Rev. 693 at 737. The authors go so far as to 
recommend that courts should limit the testimony of psychiatrists to descriptive statements, 
excluding diagnoses, judgments and predictions, effectively removing their “expert” status (at 
696).
128 Charles P. Ewing, “‘Dr. Death’ and the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and Psycho-
logical Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings” (1982) 8 Am. J. L. & 
Med. 407.
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ated with these professions.129 He urged psychiatrists and psychologists 
to adopt an ethical ban on predictions of dangerousness where capital 
sentencing was possible. One review of testimony given during capital 
risk assessments listed numerous errors mental health professionals fell 
prey to, including failure to consider context, over-reliance on clini-
cal interviews, misapplication of psychological testing, and misuse of 
patterns of behaviour.130 Noting the consequences of several of these 
failings, Greenberg suggested that psychiatric diagnoses not be used in 
forensic settings, and recommended instead an emphasis on functional 
analyses.131 
Eugenia La Fontaine asserted that due to the severity of the con-
sequences, higher standards of reliability should be required when de-
termining the admissibility of evidence during capital sentencing, and 
that expert predictions of dangerousness in such cases are unconstitu-
tional.132
2. Dissenting Opinions
There are, of course, those who hold contrary opinions. Randy Otto 
claims that the empirical literature in this area has been misinterpret-
ed.133+HVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHUHZHUHOLPLWDWLRQVLQWKHÀUVWJHQHUDWLRQRI
129 Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, “Don’t Confuse Me with the Facts: Common 
Errors in Violence Risk Assessment at Capital Sentencing” (1999) 26 Criminal Justice and Be-
havior 20.
130 Stuart A. Greenberg, Daniel W. Shuman & Robert G. Meyer, “Unmasking Forensic Diagno-
sis” (2004) 27 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 1.
131 Eugenia T. La Fontaine, “A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why Expert Pre-
dictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases are Unconstitutional” (2002) 44 B.C.L. Rev. 
207. See pp. 208-10 for a fascinating discussion of Texas’s “Dr. Death,” Dr. James Grigson. As 
of 1994, he had appeared in at least 150 capital trials on behalf of the state, and his predictions 
of future dangerousness had been used to help convict at least one-third of all Texas death row 
LQPDWHV'U*ULJVRQKDVUHSHDWHGO\WHVWLÀHGWKDWKHZDV´RQHKXQGUHGSHUFHQWFHUWDLQµWKDWWKH
defendant would be dangerous in the future, and habitually refers to defendants as being in the 
“most severe category” of sociopaths, referring to one individual as “above ten” on a scale of 
one to ten. Indeed, in one case, he even claimed that the defendant presented a “one thousand 
percent chance” of being a future danger.
132 Randy K. Otto, “On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to ‘Predict Dangerousness’: 
A Commentary on Interpretations of the ‘Dangerousness’ Literature” (1994) 18 Law & Psychol. 
Rev. 43.
133 Ibid. at 64.
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research that placed a limit on how accurate predictions could be, such 
DVWKHXVHRISUR[\PHDVXUHVRIYLROHQFHULVNDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFODVVLÀFD-
tions used to infer expert’s opinions). He claims that later efforts were 
more successful. He remains guarded, however, when he suggests that 
“mental health professionals have some ability to assess the risk that 
SHRSOHSUHVHQWUHJDUGLQJOHJDOO\UHOHYDQWGHÀQLWLRQVRI¶GDQJHURXVQHVV·
although rates of error, remain considerable.”134 
One recent study tracked the prison infraction records of Arizona 
death-row inmates.135 The researchers concluded that inmates sentenced 
to death might, in fact, be more dangerous than others, based on their 
tendency to be involved in serious prison violence. Of course, living in 
WKHEUXWDOZRUOGRIKLJKVHFXULW\FRQÀQHPHQWGXULQJWKHÀQDOGD\VRI
one’s life creates confounding factors.
2WKHUVKDYHDUJXHG WKDWDVVHVVPHQWVVKRXOGEH OLPLWHG WRVSHFLÀF
legal contexts. Heilbrun136 suggested that in decisions relating to public 
safety and rehabilitation, forensic assessments might be useful. How-
HYHURWKHUFULWHULDWKDWPD\EHUHOHYDQWLQWKHFODVVLÀFDWLRQRIDGDQJHU-
RXVRIIHQGHULQFOXGLQJJRDOVVXFKDVVSHFLÀFGHWHUUHQFHDQGPRUHVH-
vere punishment, are “clearly outside the domain of…expertise. Simply 
stated, mental health professionals are not competent to address such 
issues.”137
3. Summary
Many researchers have argued that due to the chronic uncertainty of 
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, such testimony should have 
OLPLWHGLQÁXHQFHLQVHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVRUVKRXOGEHH[FOXGHGHQWLUH-
O\(PSLULFDOGDWDKDVFRQÀUPHGWKHIDOOLELOLW\RIVXFKSUHGLFWLRQV
134 Matt DeLisi & Ed A. Munoz, “Future Dangerousness Revisited” (2003) 14 Criminal Justice 
Policy Review 287.
135 Kirk Heilbrun, James R. P. Ogloff & Kim Picarello, “Dangerous Offender Statutes in the 
United States and Canada: Implications for Risk Assessment” (1999) 22 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 
393.
136 Ibid. at 401.
137 Supra, note 7.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Absent a major legislative reversal, psychiatric assessments in the crim-
inal justice system are here to stay. The following recommendations are 
offered in order to minimize socially detrimental errors, and in order to 
make optimal use of the information that is available (however imper-
fect). These represent the most promising treatments for the current case 
of disorder in the courtroom.
The opportunity for the Crown and defence to retain their own psy-
chiatric experts should be reintroduced. These experts should be required 
to defend their conclusions and the process by which they reached them. 
An impartial court-appointed assessor should be made available in the 
FDVHRIFRQÁLFWLQJDQGHTXDOO\FUHGLEOH&URZQDQGGHIHQFHH[SHUWV
The use of the PCL-R in all forensic risk assessments should be re-
quired. The PCL-R has proven to be a more robust predictor of future 
violence than other tools, such as the DSM-IV APD diagnosis. As the 
PCL-R accounts for the greatest number of factors in an offender’s per-
sonal circumstances, it is most sensitive to the unique factual matrix in 
each assessment of dangerousness.
Existing dangerous offender designations should be reviewed where 
WKHÀQGLQJZDVEDVHGRQROGHUOHVVUHOLDEOHSV\FKRORJLFDOWHFKQLTXHV
In changing the language in the Criminal Code from “observation” to 
“assessment,” it is submitted that Parliament intended that the more 
modern actuarial techniques be used, rather than the clinical observation 
method. Offenders currently serving indeterminate sentences based on 
less valid methods should receive a new hearing and assessment using 
the PCL-R.
Parole reviews should be conducted a minimum of every 2 years 
from the beginning of the sentence. Opportunities should be provided 
to demonstrate a decrease in dangerousness resulting from psychologi-
cal treatment, or the decrease in aggression generally exhibited with 
age. Unnecessarily long prison sentences create a circular problem, as 
the increasing effects of institutionalization virtually eliminate the op-
portunity to create a viable release plan. The Bill C-55 amendments,138 
which increased the initial parole review period from three to seven 
years, demonstrate that the potential for overly long sentences exists 
from the moment of incarceration.
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3DUROHERDUGVVKRXOGEHUHTXLUHGWRVSHFLÀFDOO\FRQVLGHUDQ\FKDQJH
in dangerousness that has occurred since the last review. Consequently, 
new assessments should be ordered in response to potential rehabilita-
tion of the individual inmate, instead of according to guidelines which 
do not account for differences between individuals.
*HQHUDOO\GDQJHURXVRIIHQGHUGLVSRVLWLRQV VKRXOGEHÁH[LEOHDQG
sensitive to individual factors. Following the line of reasoning that start-
ed with Neve and was continued with Winko and Knoblauch, the least 
onerous restrictions, which still protect the public, should be imposed, 
having regard to the particular circumstances of the offender and the 
context in which his crimes were committed.
VI. CONCLUSION: MAKING THE MOST OF WHAT WE HAVE
,QVWHDGRI RIIHULQJ WKHGHÀQLWLYH DQVZHUV WKDW RXU DGYHUVDULDO V\VWHP
idealizes, psychiatric assessments of future dangerousness are plagued 
with uncertainty. This uncertainty is only compounded by taking this 
information out of its context and thrusting it into the courtroom, where 
it is presented by psychiatrists who have no legal training, and received 
by judges who have never seen a copy of the DSM. 
It is clear, however, that even the most reliable measure, the PCL-R, 
is only moderately accurate, and its usefulness is still being tested in the 
psychological literature. Despite these shortcomings, forensic assess-
PHQWVDUHJLYHQVLJQLÀFDQWZHLJKWLQVHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQV,QIDFWWKH
Criminal Code mandates that an assessment be completed in determin-
ing whether an individual is one of those few offenders who are suf-
ÀFLHQWO\GDQJHURXV WR MXVWLI\ WKHLU LPSULVRQPHQWIRUDQ LQGHWHUPLQDWH
period.
The psychiatrist must not eclipse the role of the court in such cases. 
As psychological risk assessments are based in large part on the offend-
er’s criminal history, the judge must make his or her own evaluation of 
KRZWKLVUHÁHFWVRQIXWXUHEHKDYLRXU7KHLPSDFWRISV\FKRPHWULFWHVWV
should be limited to those areas in which they supplement, and not re-
place, the court’s judgment, such as in prospects for rehabilitation.
There are two main problems with the heavy reliance upon psychi-
atric predictions of dangerousness; a lack of consensus regarding meth-
ods, and the fallibility of the “objective” assessment tools that are most 
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frequently utilized. This uncertainty begs the question of whether it is 
appropriate for the government to impose such restrictive measures at 
all⎯GRHVWKHSXQLVKPHQWWUXO\ÀWWKHSRWHQWLDOFULPH"
